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SUMMARY 
The objectives of this study was to investigate smallholder farmers’ behaviour and perceptions 
on biosecurity and to describe a recent outbreak of African swine fever (ASF) on a farm in an 
ASF endemic setting, with focus on biosecurity aspects.  
Biosecurity is a prerequisite for successful pig production but many smallholder farmers lack 
the ability to implement such measures, for several reasons, making their animals more prone 
to acquire infectious diseases.  
ASF is a viral disease, affecting pigs with high morbidity and mortality. The disease has a 
complex epidemiology with a sylvatic cycle as well as a domestic cycle, thus in endemic 
countries there are many routes of transmission.  
This study found that smallholder pig farmers had confidence that biosecurity could protect 
their pigs, but smallholders that recently lost pigs in ASF had a lower confidence in 
biosecurity. The tendency to invest in biosecurity equipment was higher in households with 
an additional source of income compared to households with crop farming income only. 
The recent ASF outbreak and the investigation that followed, showed that despite high 
ambitions and investments, ASF was introduced to the herd with severe consequences, wiping 
out all animals in the course of three months. In the ASF endemic setting of the farm, several 
possible ways of introduction were identified as well as actions performed during the 
outbreak that enabled the disease to be spread throughout the farm.  
SAMMANFATTNING 
Målen med studien var att undersöka beteenden och uppfattningar om biosäkerhet hos 
småskaliga djurproducenter samt att beskriva ett nyligt utbrott av afrikansk svinpest (ASF) i 
en besättning belägen i ett ASF-endemiskt område, med fokus på biosäkerhetsaspekter. 
Biosäkerhet är en grundförutsättning för framgångsrik djurproduktion, men många småskaliga 
djurhållare saknar av flera skäl möjligheten att implementera sådana åtgärder, med 
konsekvensen att deras djur löper högre risk att drabbas av infektiösa sjukdomar. 
ASF är en viral sjukdom hos grisar med hög mortalitet och morbiditet. Sjukdomens 
epidemiologi är komplex med bland annat en sylvatisk cykel och en cykel bland tamgrisar 
med följden att det finns många möjliga smittvägar i endemiska länder. 
Denna studie fann att småskaliga grishållare hade tilltro att biosäkerhet kunde skydda deras 
grisar, men att de grishållare som nyligen förlorat grisar i ASF hade ett generellt lägre 
förtroende för biosäkerhet. Tendensen att investera i biosäkerhetsutrustning var högre i 
hushåll med ytterligare inkomstkällor än hos de hushåll som försörjde sig genom endast sitt 
jordbruk. 
Det nyliga utbrottet av ASF och den utredning som vidtogs visade att trots den höga 
ambitionen och investeringen kunde ASF introduceras i besättningen med allvarliga 
konsekvenser, samtliga grisar var döda inom tre månader. I den ASF-endemiska omgivningen 
kunde flertalet möjliga källor till introduktion identifieras liksom handlingar som ledde till att 
sjukdomen kunde spridas i hela besättningen.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This study was performed as a Minor field study (MFS) and was part of a Sida-financed 
research project in Uganda performed in collaboration between the Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences (SLU), the National Veterinary Institute (SVA), Makerere University, 
Kampala, Uganda and International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). 
The study consisted of two parts: 1) a household level interview study performed among 
smallholder pig farmers in Gulu District using a questionnaire and 2) a case-study of an 
African swine fever outbreak in a larger pig farm in Lira District. 
African swine fever (ASF), a haemorrhagic pig disease with high mortality, is endemic in 
Uganda. Domestic pigs develop symptoms while wild African suids such as warthogs and 
bushpigs are asymptomatic carriers of the virus. Soft ticks of the Ornithodoros spp are the 
natural reservoirs of the virus in Africa and may act as vectors (Costard et al., 2009b). 
Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa. A vast majority of the population live in rural 
areas and poverty is more widespread in these areas compared with urban areas (World Bank, 
2014). For smallholders in Uganda, the keeping of pigs provide an extra income as well as a 
complement of protein in people’s diets. ASF constitutes a potent threat to pig production as 
the disease’s morbidity and mortality is very high (Kabuuka et al., 2014). 
Biosecurity can be defined as the preventive measures taken to protect animals from 
infectious diseases. This includes prevention of transmitting infections within and between 
farms (Fasina et al., 2012a). By preventing animal diseases, financial and social losses for 
people keeping livestock can be reduced. Implementation of biosecurity measures is also of 
importance for animal welfare as animal diseases can be a negative effect on animal welfare. 
The objective of this study was to investigate the behaviour and perceptions of smallholder 
farmers focusing on biosecurity and to describe a recent ASF-outbreak on a larger farm, with 
the aim to identify relevant biosecurity factors.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Control measures to prevent animal diseases in smallholder farms 
For the prevention of animal diseases, biosecurity is fundamental (Penrith & Vosloo, 2009). 
Conan et al. (2012) describe that biosecurity is not standardized, and it is therefore required to 
adapt biosecurity measures according to disease.  
Biosecurity in this context can be defined as measures implemented to prevent introduction of 
infectious diseases to, and spread within, the herd.  
To enable successful pig production in ASF endemic countries, as well as elsewhere, 
biosecurity is considered a prerequisite (Fasina et al., 2012a). 
When looking at on-farm biosecurity among pig farms in the Philippines, Alawneh et al. 
(2014) found that larger commercial and smallholder farms (mean number of animals 3102 
and 22 respectively) had implemented adequate biosecurity measures to prevent disease 
introduction to their herds when compared to smaller commercial and smallholder farms 
(mean number of animals 481 and 9 respectively). Many of the smaller farms in the study had 
a farm layout with a market pen on the farm, enabling livestock traders with vehicles to come 
in close proximity to the animals, which is hazardous in terms of disease prevention (Alawneh 
et al., 2014).  
A Laotian study on knowledge of smallholders on biosecurity with focus on Foot and mouth 
disease (FMD) and haemorrhagic septicaemia (HS) in large ruminants showed that the 
knowledge on health, disease and nutrition was limited (Nampanya et al., 2010). These 
findings are consistent with the results of a Nigerian study where inadequate understanding 
and implementation of biosecurity was reported among smallholder pig farmers. Risk 
behaviours practised by these smallholders were selling of survivor pigs, slaughtering ASF-
infected animals within their pig premises and visiting other infected pig premises or 
slaughter slabs without any precaution (Fasina et al., 2012b).  
On the other hand, Crafoord (2014) describes that smallholder farmers in Gulu district, 
Uganda, were able to identify parameters for successful pig farming. Parameters described 
were general cleanliness, reducing access for visitors, good housing etc, indicating an 
understanding for basic control measures.  
Penrith & Vosloo (2009) have compiled the following examples of preventive measures for 
impeding infectious disease in animals; implementing disinfection of visitors to the animals 
by providing veterinarians or workers with protective clothes and disinfectant foot bath. Such 
protective clothing is not to leave the farm after it has been used. Another preventive measure 
is the ensuring that the number of visitors is kept at a minimum and not granting people or 
vehicles access to the area were animals are kept. Is is also concluded that disinfectant foot 
bath should not be seen as the only precaution, as it is not entirely effective (Penrith & 
Vosloo, 2009). 
Smallholder farmers 
Alawneh et al. (2014) describe smallholder pig farmers in the Philippines as keeping up to 41 
pigs for household consumption and financial security. These smallholders experience a high 
level of exposure to infectious disease due to direct and indirect contact, for example mixing 
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of pigs and people or vehicles entering the area were pigs are kept. This type of animal 
husbandry makes disease prevention and control difficult (Alawneh et al., 2014). 
In terms of disease control, it is crucial to ensure that smallholders participate in the 
implementation of control strategies, to achieve the objective of not enabling further 
transmission of disease. This is especially true in countries where ASF is endemic, like 
Uganda, where veterinary services often are unable to ensure compliance with regulations, 
due to lacking resources (Costard et al., 2009b). 
Smallholder awareness regarding animal diseases has been described as lacking (Costard et 
al., 2009b; Nampanya et al., 2010). But when it comes to ASF in Uganda, Chenais et al. 
(2015) describe that many smallholders are aware of clinical signs, disease transmission as 
well as disease control. The results of Chenais et al. (2015) indicate that it is not lack of 
knowledge among smallholders that enables the virus to be transmitted, but it can be regarded 
as at least in part caused by inadequate management due to poverty. 
As previously mentioned, a majority of Ugandans live in rural areas were poverty is 
widespread. Many smallholder farmers in these rural areas lack access to vehicles or roads, 
which obstructs their access to markets. They are prevented from enjoying the benefits of 
technology and advances in optimizing production and in reducing disease (World Bank, 
2014; Rural poverty portal, 2014). Crafoord (2014) describe that the reason that smallholders 
in Uganda kept pigs free range was due to lack of money and/or feeds. Another difficulty 
experienced by smallholder pig farmers is the low status of pig keeping in some cultures, 
which could further obstruct the implementation of preventive or control measures (Crafoord, 
2014). 
African swine fever 
African swine fever (ASF) is an important pig disease, endemic in most sub-Saharan 
countries (Penrith et al., 2013). The disease is caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV), a 
large DNA-virus, and there is currently no vaccine available (Costard et al., 2009b). The lack 
of a vaccine makes the prevention of the disease focus solely on preventing contact between 
susceptible host animals and the virus (Penrith & Vosloo., 2009). In its original setting in 
Africa the virus is maintained in its wildlife hosts; wild suids and soft ticks of the 
Ornithodoros spp. Wild African pigs are asymptomatic carriers and only domestic pigs 
develop symptoms (Costard et al., 2009b).  
Warthogs do not appear to spread the virus, neither horizontally nor vertically, but soft ticks 
that feed from warthogs can transmit the virus to other pigs. Warthog piglets are infected by 
soft ticks while still in the burrow, where the soft ticks reside, and subsequently get viraemia 
lasting two-three weeks. Once infected, the soft ticks of Ornitodoros spp. are able to retain the 
virus for a long time (Costard et al., 2009b). 
ASFV in transmitted between domestic pigs via direct contact between animals, different 
forms of indirect contact such as contaminated objects (equipment, clothes, boots etc), via 
pigs consuming contaminated pork and through infected soft ticks. Infected pigs shed virus 
before showing any clinical signs as well as when clinical signs have developed (Penrith & 
Vosloo., 2009).  
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Another cycle of transmission exists between domestic pigs and soft ticks and a third cycle is 
constituted by transmission between domestic pigs only, without the involvement of the wild 
hosts (Penrith et al., 2013). In several endemic areas in Africa, the most important mean of 
transmission of the virus is between domestic pigs (Costard et al., 2009a; Costard et al., 
2009b).  
Impact of ASF 
The consequences of ASF are severe for farmers, as well as for affected nations and for 
international trade. Poorer pig producers often lack the ability to implement basic biosecurity 
measures which make their animals more prone to acquiring infectious diseases. Diseases 
such as ASF constitutes a threat to their herds and consequently their economy, as well as 
affecting the possibility of endemic countries to establish on external markets (Costard et al., 
2009b; Fasina et al., 2012b). In addition to the strain ASF adds to the economy, the disease is 
also a potent threat to animal welfare and food security (Costard et al., 2009b). 
Risk factors for ASF infection 
Penrith et al. (2013) identified large pig populations with high contact rates as a risk factor for 
ASF. The constant source of naïve pigs to infect creates a situation where an outbreak can 
continue for a long period of time. The disorganisation of the pig sector in Africa and the risk 
it constitutes for transmitting ASF, is amplified by large pig populations (Penrith et al., 2013; 
Penrith & Vosloo, 2009).  
Contact between domestic pigs and the sylvatic cycle or ASF-infected material are risk 
factors for ASF, and free range pigs are at a higher risk for being exposed to ASF (Penrith et 
al., 2013; Fasina et al., 2012a; Fasina et al., 2012b). Exposure can occur both through direct 
contact with infected animals and when domestic pigs scavenge on carcasses from pigs that 
died in ASF or on waste containing contaminated pork (Penrith & Vosloo, 2009). Free range 
pig movements and lacking biosecurity are other factors that facilitate domestic pigs being 
exposed to ASFV. Other examples are the mixing of animals at markets or during transport as 
well as slaughtering without proper waste management or cleaning (Costard et al., 2009b).  
Keeping pigs confined, however, make them dependent on humans for water, feeds, hygiene 
and other aspects of well-being. Confined animals are still at risk of ASF or other infectious 
diseases if hygiene or biosecurity is inadequate. In Africa, affordable pig feed is uncommon, 
resulting in confined pigs being fed household or restaurant waste, which could contain 
contaminated pork products (Penrith et al., 2013).  
Risk factors for ASF infection on farm level identified in a Nigerian study were keeping of 
pig herds that are not closed herds, and not to practice quarantine when buying new animals 
that are potentially infected or have been in contact with infected pigs. Service boars are also 
considered as potential risks of infection. Further factors associated with a high risk of 
contracting ASF were if an abattoir or infected pig farm was present in the area of pig farms 
(Fasina et al., 2012b). 
A likely way of introduction of ASF is via infected pork products (Costard et al., 2009b). 
When ASF has been introduced to continents outside Africa, it is considered to be a result of 
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infected pork products (Costard et al., 2009b; Penrith et al., 2013). Movement of infected pigs 
and contaminated pork products is also what has caused the majority of recent outbreaks in 
Africa (Penrith & Vosloo, 2009).  
Preventive measures for ASF 
Lack of biosecurity is considered to be the main reason for the persistence of ASFV in the 
Nigerian pig population (Fasina et al., 2012a). To prevent ASF, strict biosecurity measures 
need to be established between the virus and its susceptible hosts. As the virus lacks the 
ability to be transmitted over large distances without human interference, biosecurity makes 
ASF-prevention possible (Penrith & Vosloo., 2009). 
Possible preventive measures to stop spread of ASF in endemic areas could be to control local 
markets with live animals, discourage the keeping of free range pigs as well as farm visits by 
middlemen within the pig sector. These measures focus on the most important risk factors for 
transmission of the disease (Costard et al., 2009a; Costard et al., 2009b).  
As introduction of ASF via pork is considered to be an important means of transmission in 
Africa as well as elsewhere (Costard et al., 2009b; Penrith & Vosloo, 2009; Penrith et al., 
2013), prohibiting the feeding of leftovers or waste to pigs is a preventive measure of great 
importance (Penrith & Vosloo, 2009). However, when keeping in mind the economic 
situation of the smallholders and the absence of affordable pig feeds in these settings, feeding 
pigs leftovers is at least more advisable than feeding them waste, as the leftovers have been 
heat treated.  
Preventive measures with the aim to prevent ASF, such as protective clothing, disinfectant 
foot bath, keeping the number of visitors to a minimum, would also, if fully understood and 
implemented, hinder the transmission of other diseases (Penrith & Vosloo., 2009). 
Confinement of pigs reduce the losses experienced during outbreaks of ASF (Penrith et al., 
2013). In low income countries like Uganda, pig husbandry systems as well as biosecurity 
could be improved to control the disease and its transmission (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2012). 
FIELD STUDIES 
Objectives 
The objectives were: 
- To investigate smallholder farmers’ behaviour and perceptions regarding biosecurity 
- To describe an outbreak of ASF on a larger farm, with focus on biosecurity aspects 
- To gain knowledge about veterinary practice and research in a low-income country 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
The study was performed during September-November 2014 and consisted of two parts: a 
household interview study targeting smallholder farmers (Study one) and one descriptive 
case-study of an ASF outbreak in a larger pig farm (Study two). The study was carried out in 
collaboration with Mikaela Klahr Fritz, a fellow veterinary student, with her study focusing 
on the socio-economic impact of animal diseases in smallholder settings. 
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Study one  
Study area 
Study one was performed in Gulu District of Northern Uganda. Gulu has a human population 
of approximately 444000 according to the 2014 census (Ubos, 2014). All 12 subcounties and 
a subdivision of Gulu municipality were included in the study.  
The Gulu area has been severely affected by the civil war recently fought between 
government troops and rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Today, Gulu town is 
characterized by peace and tranquillity and the population, which has experienced a massive 
increase of almost 400% in 23 years, is now battling with poverty, high unemployment rates 
and a high HIV/AIDS prevalence compared to the rest of Uganda (Briggs, 2013; Accorsi et 
al., 2005; Ubos, 2014). In post-conflict Gulu, keeping of pigs and other livestock, is an 
important source of income as well as an important protein complement in the population’s 
diets. Conventional saving of capital in banks is rare, and people tend to invest in livestock 
rather than putting money in the bank (personal communication, T.Aliro, DVO Gulu). This is 
a very vulnerable way of saving capital, as there are several infectious animal diseases which 
have the potency to wipe out animals, and consequently, people’s savings. African swine 
fever is an example of such a disease. 
Study design 
Study one was a household interview study with 198 included households. These households 
were randomly selected from a sampling frame of 4000 pig keeping households from all 12 
subcounties. The sampling frame used had been created previously using local informants (so 
called Community Knowledge Workers) and as part of previous research activities within the 
longterm project. All villages in the included parishes had been visited, and interviews with a 
maximum of 20 pig keeping households in each village had been conducted. One round of 
interviews had already been carried out in all the included households approximately six 
months earlier within the long-term project on ASF previously mentioned. At the previous 
visit, the households’ GPS coordinates were noted, which also facilitated in locating the 
households for the current study.  
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire used was developed within the long-term project on ASF, and contained 70 
questions of which the majority were closed, but some were open-ended. Several questions 
were designed so the respondent would answer with her/his level of agreement to different 
statements. The respondent was an adult representing the household, able to provide sufficient 
information regarding the household’s pig keeping activities (e.g head of household or 
spouse/adult child to head of household). For this study not all questions of the questionnaire 
were included as it is used in whole in the previously mentioned research project. The 
interviews were held in the local language, Luo, by two different enumerators from the Gulu 
district veterinary office, and the duration of the interviews were between 30-60 minutes with 
few exceptions. The questions included in this study are shown in table 1.  
For the complete questionnaire used for Study one please see appendix 1. 
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Data compiling and analysis 
Data was recorded on paper-copies of the questionnaire. As soon as possible after each 
interview the data from the questionnaires was entered into EasyResearch, an internet-based 
tool provided by QuestBack (QuestBack International HQ, Oslo, Norway), whereupon the 
data could be processed in Microsoft Excel. The statistical analysis was later conducted in 
RStudio (Version 0.98.495 – © 2009-2013 RStudio, Inc., Boston, MA), with chi-square tests 
using the commands “table” and “chisq.test”. Results were considered statistically significant 
if the p-value ≤0.05.  
Study two  
Study population 
Adina Foundation is a Norwegian non-governmental organisation (NGO) with a branch of the 
foundation situated in the Ugandan city of Lira in northern Uganda. Adina Foundation in Lira 
is constituted by Lira Rehabilitation Centre (LRC) and Adina farm, a piggery established to 
economically support the LRC. LRC has the objective to rehabilitate children with disabilities 
and underprivileged children. The aim of Adina farm was to produce piglets and pork of top 
quality but also to offer training for small scale farmers in Lira District. Adina farm is not a 
typical example of a smallholder farm, but is included in the study as a valuable example of 
biosecurity and the challenges facing a pig farm situated in an ASF endemic setting.  
The Foundation’s vision is to have an agricultural training centre in place within the 
compound. 
The breeding of the pigs started in midyear of 2013 and at the start of 2014 there were 
approximately 150 animals. The slaughter and sales of animals started in January-February of 
2014 and the prognosis for the entire year was to sell 200 adult pigs in addition to a smaller 
number of piglets. 
An outbreak of ASF occurred in the spring of 2014. At the beginning of the outbreak, pigs 
were sampled for ASF. ASFV was confirmed by PCR. 
Study design 
Study two was an in-depth interview study with pre-written questions and questions that came 
up during the interview. Answers were written down during the interview. Observations were 
also made during the visit to Adina farm.  
Data compiling and analysis 
Interviews with spokesperson and financial manager of Adina farm took place on two 
occasions. In addition to the interviews, data from the outbreak investigation conducted by 
Swedish and Ugandan veterinarians at the time of the outbreak was used. Further interviews 
were conducted with Michel Dione and Emily Ouma, ILRI, who had visited the farm and 
given advice after the outbreak. Information regarding biosecurity was extracted from the 
investigation data. 
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Table 1 Questions from the questionnaire included in study one, investigating views on biosecurity in 
smallholder households in Gulu District from a household survey conducted between September-
November 2014 
Questions 
number 
Question 
22. Does the household have off-farm income? 
23. Is the household engaged in the following pig related activities; pig 
trading, processing of pork/pork products (e.g slaughter), operating a 
butchery, operating a pork kiosk, operating a pork joint, other? 
24. Indicate the type and number of livestock kept/owned currently 
25. Indicate the different categories of pigs kept currently 
26. Have any pigs left your herd since the last visit? 
27. Pig exits 
29. Has there been any inflow of pigs through purchases, births or any 
other form since the last visit? 
30. Pig entries 
32. Have you done any expansion in the pig enterprise since last visit? 
33. If yes, specify how 
45. Indicate the source of breeding for the sows since the last visit 
48. Did you have any hired labour engaged in the pig enterprise since the 
last visit? 
50. Did your pigs receive any medical treatments (deworming, 
antiparasitic, prophylaxis, antibiotics, vaccination) since the last visit? 
51. If yes, what treatment(s)? 
53. Did you have any expenditure for biosecurity equipment (protective 
clothing, boots, disinfectants etc) since the last visit? 
54. If yes, what sort of equipment did you buy? 
55. What was your total expenditure for biosecurity equipment since the 
last visit? 
69. How do you agree with the following statements;  
 I think it is possible to protect my pigs from getting ASF by improving 
farm biosecurity 
 I would like to invest in farm biosecurity if I received advice on what 
to do 
 I would be happy to buy pork products from a slaughterhouse that 
receive pigs that have been in contact with pigs dying from ASF 
 It is safe to give pigs water that has been used to clean knives and 
pangas use for slaughtering and butchering as drinking water 
 Buying live pigs is a risk behaviour for contracting ASF 
 ASF can not be prevented 
 Improved farm biosecurity improves pig health and pig growth 
 It is possible for me to tell visitors such as veterinarians, middle men 
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and extension workers not to enter the pig house with their own boots 
RESULTS 
Study one  
Demographics 
Out of the 198 smallholder households included in the study, 156 (79%) kept pigs at the time 
of the interviews. The total number of pigs kept by the households were at the time 663 
distributed in categories of sows, boars, growers and piglets, with a mean value of 3.4 pigs per 
household (range 0-20 pigs). The majority of pigs were of local breed and the housing of pigs 
was categorised in free range, tethered and confined. Some households practised two different 
housing systems, see table 2.  
The majority of households had crop farming as their only income and one third (31%) of the 
households had off-farm income. 
The households had previously been visited within the long-term project and the last visit was 
approximately six months ago. For events that occurred since the last visit, see table 3. 
Perceptions and attitudes towards biosecurity 
Households that lost pigs due to ASF during the last six months agreed to a lesser extent that 
biosecurity would protect their pigs from getting ASF than households that had not been 
affected by ASF (p-value <0.01). See figure 1.  
Table 2 Distribution of pig housing practised by pig keeping households in Gulu District, in a survey 
conducted between September-November 2014 
Type of housing Number of households Percentage of households 
Confined 32 21% 
Tethered 35 22% 
Free range 53 34% 
Confined & tethered 4 3% 
Confined & free range 8 5% 
Tethered & free range 24 15% 
Total 156 100% 
 
The belief that ASF can not be prevented was more common among households that did not 
keep pigs confined only, compared to households that had pigs confined only, see figure 2. 
The 32 households that had pigs confined only were also more likely to agree that it was 
possible to protect pigs from contracting ASF by improving farm biosecurity. Three 
households from two different subcounties reported that their pigs had received vaccination 
against ASF.  
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Table 3 Descriptive results showing smallholder households and events that had occurred since last 
visit approximately six months earlier, from a household survey conducted between September-
November 2014 
Parameter Amount Percentage 
of 
households 
Households keeping pigs 156 78.8% 
Average number of pigs per household 3.4 (range 0-20)  
Average number of household members 7 (range 1-21)  
Number of households that lost pigs  
in ASF 
15 7.5% 
Number of households that sold pigs 130 65.6% 
Number of households that lost pigs  
in any disease 
53 26.7% 
Number of households that have  
made expansion in the pig enterprise 
23 14.7% 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Level of agreement to the statement “I think it is possible to protect my pigs by improving 
farm biosecurity“ distributed between households recently affected by ASF and not recently affected 
by ASF, p-value<0.01. 
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11 
 
Households with confined pigs were also more likely (p-value<0.01) than other households to 
have done a recent expansion in the pig enterprise. Households without other pig engagement 
(pig trading, processing of pork/pork products, operating a butchery, operating a pork joint, 
operating a pork kiosk and other) were more likely (p-value<0.01) to agree with the statement 
that it is possible to protect pigs from getting ASF by improving farm biosecurity, than 
households that engaged in other pig activities. 
Households recently affected by ASF were more willing (p-value=0.01) to buy pork products 
from a slaughterhouse that receive pigs which have been in contact with pigs dying from ASF 
compared to households not recently affected, see figure 3.  
Expenditure for biosecurity 
Households that were engaged in other pig engagements (pig trading, processing of pork/pork 
products, operating a butchery, operating a pork joint, operating a pork kiosk and other) were 
more likely to have had expenditure for biosecurity equipment than households with no other 
pig engagement (p-value <0.01). The 22 households that had had expenditure for biosecurity 
equipment since the last visit had invested in gumboots, gloves, spray pump and antiparasitic 
spraying of areas were pigs were kept. The mean value of expenditure for biosecurity 
equipment was for the 22 households approximately 19650 Ugandan shillings (equivalent to 7 
USD) with the lowest and highest amount at 5000 and 95000 Ugandan shillings respectively.  
 
 
Figure 2 Distribution of level of agreement to statement “ASF can not be prevented” compared 
between groups that keep pigs confined only (n=32) or tethered/free range or confined + other 
housing category (n=166). Answers have been labelled “Agree” for answers strongly agree, agree 
and neither agree nor disagree and “Disagree” for answers strongly disagree and disagree. The 
difference between the groups was significant, p-value<0.01. 
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Figure 3 Distribution of agreement to statement “I would be happy to buy pork products from a 
slaughterhouse that receive pigs that have been in contact with pigs dying from ASF” between 
households recently (n=15) and not recently affected (n=181) by ASF. Answers have been labelled 
“Agree” for answers agree and neither agree nor disagree and “Disagree” for answers disagree and 
strongly disagree. The difference between the groups was significant, p-value=0.01. 
 
Households with off-farm income were more likely to have bought biosecurity equipment 
than households that only had farm income, see table 4. 
The willingness to invest in biosecurity after receiving advice did not differ significantly 
between households recently and not recently affected by ASF. The distribution of answers 
given from all households is shown in figure 4. 
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Figure 4 Distribution of answers given from all households to statement “I would like to invest in farm 
biosecurity if I received advice on what to do”, from a household survey conducted in Gulu district 
between September-November 2014. 
 
Table 4 Distribution of households that had bought biosecurity equipment and had not bought 
biosecurity equipment, from a household survey in Gulu district conducted between September-
November 2014. The difference between the groups was significant, p-value=0.02 
 
 
 
 
Pig housing factors 
Confinement of pigs was not correlated to losing pigs to ASF or other diseases (this included 
reasons for pig exit: death due to disease, sold because sick and slaughter because sick). 
Buying of live pigs was not statistical significant for consequently losing pigs to ASF. The 
different points of purchase (within village, neighbouring village or other) of pigs as well as 
the keeping of other livestock was not correlated to ASF or other disease.  
Study two  
Farm layout and routines 
 Have bought  
biosecurity equipment 
Have not bought 
biosecurity equipment 
Off-farm income 12 (20%) 49 (80%) 
No other income 10 (7%) 125 (93%) 
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For a map of the compound, see figure 5. 
Figure 5 Sketched map of Adina farm compound in Lira, Uganda. (Illustration: Adina Foundation). 
 
Adina farm was fenced in with barbed wire, with a total area of approximately 40x60 m. The 
pigs were confined in a cement house with ten pens, five on each side of an aisle. Another 
three pens were situated outside, see figure 6. Outdoor pens had cement floor, wooden fence 
and a tin roof. A slaughter slab was situated within the compound. 
The animals were recruited from profit farms and were fed commercial pig feed, a mixture of 
green feeds from local suppliers and vitamin supplements. 
The pens were cleaned with a water hose and the water was led to a septic tank with a 
capacity of approximately 36m
3
. When cleaning the outside pens, cleaning water was flowing 
on the side of the construction towards the slaughter slab. The septic tank was overflowed at 
the time of the outbreak resulting in a stream of septic water which covered half of the length 
of the lower part of the fence, see figure 6.  
The staff consisted of the farm manager, two guards and one farm worker. As both guards and 
the farm worker were hired as casual labour there had been a high turn-over of staff, with four 
members of staff having left in the six months before the outbreak. All members of staff were 
provided with gumboots and overalls. The routine for the gumboots was that they should be 
disinfected before entering the pig stables and the overalls were to be washed daily.  
Slaughter of the pigs took place within the compound only three meters from the outdoor 
pens. After stunning and bleeding the blood was collected in an approximately one meter 
deep hole where it was buried. The carcasses were washed with water from a pipe and the 
water was collected in the same hole as the blood. Hair from the slaughtered pigs were 
removed and left on the ground. The pigs were hanged on a wooden construction where 
evisceration and cutting was performed. Offals were buried with the blood and water and the 
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pork taken to the Rehabilitation Centre where it was stored in freezers. For staff engaged in 
the slaughtering process, overalls and gumboots were washed after slaughter.  
Within the compound there was also an office/storage building, a smaller room for the guards 
at the gate and latrines. There was a pork joint (a simple restaurant serving pork) 
neighbouring Adina farm which also operated as a combined slaughter place. Offals from this 
neighbouring slaughter place were left in the open.  
It had occurred on several occasions that pigs had escaped their pens and gained access to the 
rest of the compound. The pigs were not individually marked and they were moved around 
between different pens without any records being kept.  
The outbreak 
At the time of the outbreak there were 35 adult pigs and 103 piglets/growers on the farm. The 
outbreak started on March 7th
 
2014 with one boar falling ill with clinical signs including fever 
(40.8°C), lack of appetite, shivering and ataxia.  
The farm was visited by Swedish and Ugandan veterinarians three times during the outbreak. 
They made several observations that indicated an inadequate understanding of biosecurity 
measures among the staff. Aborted material had, for example, been left in a pen, disinfection 
of boots was performed without prior cleaning of them and not all members of staff wore 
overalls. Slaughtering was done inside the compound close to the pig pens and pieces of meat 
were left around the slaughter slab. The slaughter slab’s wooden construction could not be 
cleaned and interfered with cleaning of the ground and the slaughter slab was covered with 
pig hairs. Dead pigs were left lying outside awaiting burial which was done within the 
compound. Sick and healthy pigs were moved between pens and no records of pig movements 
were kept. 
The capacity of the septic tank was insufficient resulting in septic water overflowing parts of 
the compound, see figure 6. Cleaning water from the inside pens was running along the 
outside of the outside pens. The flooring of the inside pens was very uneven which prevented 
proper cleaning and disinfecting.  
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Figure 6, a-b a) Adina farm indoor and outdoor pig stables b) Septic tank overflow (Photo: Erika 
Chenais). 
Dynamics of the outbreak 
The outbreak started on 7
th
 of March 2014 with one boar falling ill, the boar died the 
following day. Between 7
th
 and 23
rd
 March, 15 adult pigs and 24 young pigs died due to ASF. 
Another additional 11 adult pigs had been slaughtered and 3 young pigs had died from other 
causes. Between 23
rd
 March and 2
nd
 April, 4 adult pigs and 19 young pigs had died. Another 
additional 8 pigs had been slaughtered. The total number of dead pigs due to ASF up until 2
nd
 
April was 19 adult pigs and 43 young pigs. Another additional 19 adult pigs had been 
slaughtered. Eleven of 13 pens had pigs that died and/or were slaughtered due to ASF. For 
movements and deaths of pigs, see figure 7. 
 
Figure 7 Illustration showing indoor pig stables at Adina farm with deaths and movement of pigs 
(indicated by arrows) during the ASF outbreak indicated. Pens 5 and 6 are opposite the latrines and 
septic tank, pens 10 and 1 are by the entrance to the stables. 
 
After depopulation 
The board of Adina Foundation decided to restart the piggery after the outbreak and to realise 
the vision of an agricultural training centre.  
The last pig was slaughtered in the beginning of June 2014 whereupon the decontamination of 
the farm could commence. The outdoor area of the compound has been dug up and burned 
using papyrus and paraffin. The stables have been thoroughly cleaned and disinfected using 
BioSafe, a Virkon-based disinfectant. New cement floors have been put in and walls have 
been re-painted. The Foundation in presently negotiating with a neighbour regarding buying 
more land to facilitate the expansion. The neighbouring pork joint has gone out of business.  
DISCUSSION 
Biosecurity in the Gulu smallholder context 
The results from the study do not provide any indication of causality of events, but only 
shows correlations of different factors. 
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In Gulu district the yearly incidence of ASF was estimated at 15%, based on the interviews, 
and the disease constitutes a constant and potent threat to pig production. When identifying 
the keeping of livestock as an important source of income as well as a pathway out of poverty, 
it is clear that ASF and other infectious animal diseases have a major impact on several levels. 
Of the 15 households that lost their herds to ASF, eight had not restarted their pig production 
at the time of the interviews. Lack of compensation after outbreaks of ASF obstructs for 
smallholder farmers to restart their pig production (Costard et al., 2009b; Sánchez-Vizcaíno et 
al., 2012; Crafoord, 2014). This problem is also identified in smallholder settings outside of 
Africa and in correlation to other infectious animal diseases (Nampanya et al., 2010).  
The smallholders in Gulu who had recently been affected by ASF were less likely to believe 
that biosecurity could protect their pigs from ASF infection. It is possible that this opinion 
was held due to their recent loss and is an expression of feeling powerless in their situation. 
Another possibility is that they had a generally lower confidence in biosecurity and therefore 
had been less careful and as a consequence ASF had infected their pigs. On the other hand, 
there was no significant difference between groups recently and not recently affected in the 
willingness to invest in biosecurity, which indicates that smallholders regardless of whether 
they had lost pigs in ASF or not, had some level of trust in biosecurity.  
Three households explicitly stated that their pigs had received vaccination against ASF. It is 
possible that the actual number is higher as several respondents stated that their pigs had 
received injections or prophylaxis, without clarifying further. Crafoord (2014) has also 
described the belief among smallholders that there is a vaccine available. Vaccination against 
ASF was how the smallholders perceived the treatment given to their pigs and it is possible 
that it was an antiparasitic or antibiotic substance. Nevertheless, if a smallholder believe that 
an ASF-vaccination occurred and the pigs die from ASF, a possible long-term effect is 
reduced confidence in veterinary services as well as paying for something useless. Another 
possibility is that smallholders in the belief that their pigs are vaccinated against ASF take 
unwanted risks which could introduce the disease to the herd.  
The development of an effective vaccine is considered feasible (Costard et al., 2009b) but 
even if or when such a vaccine is developed, biosecurity will remain a necessity for successful 
pig production (Penrith & Vosloo, 2009). 
Households that were recently affected by ASF were more likely than not recently affected 
households to approve of pork purchase from a slaughterhouse receiving pigs that had been in 
contact with ASF-infected pigs. Contact-pigs could be considered a risk factor, as it is 
possible that they are not yet showing clinical signs, and will be a possible source of infection 
as contaminated pork. Tejler (2012) found that at least 8 of 16 outbreaks of ASF in Gulu 
district 2010-2011 were probably introduced by contaminated pork, which further emphasises 
the importance of pork as a mean of ASF introduction, both in the Gulu context and 
elsewhere. 
When looking at all households in this study, the general opinion is that households do not 
approve of this type of pork purchase, which supports the findings of Crafoord (2014), that 
the awareness of pork being a possible way of transmission for ASF was widespread among 
smallholders in Gulu district.  
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One third of the households included in the study had off-farm income and these households 
were more likely to have invested in biosecurity. It is likely that these households had more 
financial resources than households with only farm income which enabled them to make such 
investments. It should be noted that the mere purchase of gumboots or other equipment is not 
the solution for keeping the herd free from ASF or other infectious disease, but the investment 
should be regarded as an indicator of the household’s attitude towards biosecurity. Financial 
resources is not the same as literacy and/or level of development, but these parameters are not 
entirely disconnected in smallholder settings. With this in mind the findings of this study are 
not corresponding with the findings of a Laotian study on smallholders’ knowledge on 
biosecurity and diseases in large ruminants, where the province with the highest literacy rate 
and level of development had the lowest knowledge scores of all provinces in the study 
(Nampanya et al., 2010). 
Households that kept pigs confined were equally affected by ASF as was households that 
practised other housing systems. This is in contrast with the findings of Penrith et al. (2013), 
were confinement of pigs reduced losses during ASF outbreaks. Many households in this 
study practised two different housing systems and any protecting effect by keeping pigs 
confined could have been lessened by free range pigs in the same household. Pig housing is a 
factor that vary depending on season (Chenais et al., 2015; Crafoord, 2014). It is possible that 
the findings in this study would be different if conducted at another time of the year or with a 
larger sample size, as it is difficult to get significant results with smaller sample groups.  
The response rate was high in the interviews, which is positive for the reliability of the results. 
The interviews were conducted in Luo which was the main language of the respondents. As 
the interviewers spoke both Luo and English, confounding results due to language was 
minimised. It is however possible that certain smaller aspects were lost in the translation to 
English, but it is not considered to have been significant for the results. The questionnaire can 
be regarded as extensive, and as the respondents were asked about numerous details of the 
household’s activities from the past six months, it is possible that some answers given were 
not correct. There were only two interviewers used, who had previously received training in 
interview techniques. Nevertheless, the personalities and skills of the interviewers can also 
have influenced the answers.  
The challenges facing the Gulu smallholders are many, but it must be considered as promising 
that they generally have a high knowledge on ASF in combination with a high trust in 
biosecurity. These aspects could help improve their situation. A major constraint is, however, 
their economic situation, and the impact it has on their possibilities to change their traditional 
free range pig husbandry systems as well as investing in biosecurity equipment. The role of 
livestock is complex in these settings, and livestock has the potential to reduce poverty. 
Simultaneously, infectious animal diseases, such as ASF, have a severe impact and can 
further deepen the smallholders’ poverty. 
Biosecurity is indeed a basic condition to reduce infectious animal diseases and when 
implemented and followed it can consequently improve the livelihood for many.  
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The example of Adina farm 
ASF constitutes a constant threat to pig production in endemic countries. Despite the high 
ambition of Adina farm, and the considerable investments made, ASF wiped out the entire 
herd. The staff have become aware of the importance of biosecurity and it is essential that it is 
kept in mind for the future that no matter how many measures are implemented or how strict 
they are, the key is to make sure that all members of staff as well as visitors oblige to the rules 
and respect the routines implemented.  
Probable entry of disease 
Finding the way of entry is made difficult by the fact that investigation and analysis is being 
done retrospectively. Furthermore, crucial information is lacking due to that Adina farm kept 
insufficient records. Information on natural services and visitor routines are missing and 
would be important pieces of information to add to the overall picture. It should also be noted 
that Lira District and the surrounding area around Adina farm can be regarded as containing 
several potential sources of ASF infection. 
The boar that was the first sick and dead animal during the outbreak had escaped its pen and 
was running around within the compound six days before showing symptoms. Keeping in 
mind the pork joint and slaughter place that was neighbouring the farm, it is possible that 
infectious pork material had been thrown over the fence and was found and eaten by the boar, 
making the virus entry feed-borne. The boar was later returned to its pen where it could pass 
the infection horizontally to other animals. It is well known that contaminated pork is an 
important way of introducing ASF (Costard et al., 2009b; Penrith & Vosloo., 2009; Penrith et 
al., 2013; Tejler, 2012).  
Adina farm had routines regarding protective clothing for the staff, but the routines were not 
followed. The possibility of indirect transmission, where a member of staff had ASF-
contaminated material on shoes, clothing or equipment and later came in contact with the 
pigs, can not be ruled out. Indirect contact as a means of ASF transmission is not to be 
underestimated in this type of setting, as described by Costard et al. (2009b) and Sánchez-
Vizcaíno et al. (2012). 
Sabotage is another possible way of entry, that someone deliberately transmitted the infection, 
for example by feeding the pigs contaminated pork. This way of entry is however regarded as 
unlikely, Adina farm was at the time an employer to many people, as well as doing important 
work for underprivileged children. The results of transmitting ASF to the pigs at the farm was 
that several people became unemployed and the funding to the Rehabilitation Centre and their 
important work was cut off. The outbreak resulted in losses on several levels – animals lost, 
loss of revenue as well as job opportunities, and it is difficult to find any particular benefits 
from the outbreak. 
Factors that facilitated the spread of the disease within the farm 
Several factors were of importance for enabling the spread within the farm. Animals were 
being moved and staff moved between pens and between tending to sick and healthy animals 
without adequate preventive measures. Slaughtering of pigs occurred in close proximity to 
healthy pigs, with an obvious risk of transmitting virus from dead to live pigs. Fasina et al 
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(2012b) state that a high risk factor for contracting ASF on farm level is the presence of an 
abattoir in the area of pig farms.  
Biosecurity measures after the outbreak  
Several improvements of biosecurity need to be made to prevent future outbreaks and 
measures taken to remove viable virus that may still be within the compound. As Uganda is 
an endemic country for ASF, the threat of ASF remains present. 
Below follows my biosecurity recommendations for Adina farm. 
Clean and dirty zones should be established with barriers between. Example of barriers is one 
at the entry to the farm and at entry to stables. At these barriers, boots and overalls should be 
changed.  
Trained staff that know and respect the routines should remain employed, high staff turnover 
should be avoided, which is also desirable according to Fasina et al. (2012a).  
The capacity of the septic tank has been inadequate with consequences of septic water and 
material overflowing within the compound. This problem could be solved by a bigger tank, or 
by having the tank emptied more frequently. When emptying the tank, it must be ensured that 
adaption between the tank, the pipes and the lorry is tight to prevent leaking of septic 
material. As the location of the septic tank is far from the road, a lorry emptying it must enter 
the compound. This demands the adequate cleaning of the lorry prior to entering the 
compound. The septic material emptied from the tank must also be taken care of in an 
acceptable manner, to rule out transmission of pathogens from the septic material.  
Slaughter should be performed outside of the compound (not in the clean zone). Preferably, a 
slaughter slab should be fenced to ensure that unauthorised people do not have access to it. 
The slaughter slab used must be constructed on a cemented area or equivalent to ensure 
satisfactory cleaning after slaughter. Slaughtering should be performed using staff and 
equipment that is only used for this purpose. Staff re-entering the compound after 
slaughtering should clean themselves and equipment used in slaughter before entering the 
compound. Staff working with slaughter should not attend the pigs. Remnants of pigs (skin, 
head, bones) must, if they are not sold, be buried deep like blood and offals. Kabuuka et al. 
(2014) describe the lack of well-established slaughter systems as a potent way of spreading 
ASF in Uganda.  
Keeping of books is essential to keep track of the pig herd, their whereabouts, diseases, deaths 
and births. This is described as an on-farm biosecurity measure by Kabuuka et al. (2014). It 
would also be helpful to have pigs individually marked. Movement of pigs between pens 
should be kept to a minimum. Pigs escaping and later returned to their pens is not acceptable, 
measures to ensure that pigs do not escape need to be implemented. If pigs still escape, they 
should be quarantined and not instantly returned to the rest of the herd. 
In accordance with the decision of the board of Adina Foundation, Adina farm will also hold 
an agricultural training site within the compound that houses the piggery. This type of dual 
purpose compound highlights the importance of biosecurity, and means that biosecurity 
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measures implemented also need to be understood and respected by visitors involved in the 
agricultural training.  
During the outbreak at Adina farm, the staff used disinfectants on their boots without prior 
cleaning. As organic material makes disinfectant foot baths ineffective, it is possible that the 
procedure performed during the outbreak gave the staff a sense of false security.  
In a review article on biosecurity for backyard poultry, it is concluded that many farmers in 
low-income countries lack knowledge of how to properly use disinfectants to protect their 
animals (Conan et al., 2012). 
The outbreak at Adina farm is a good example of the challenges facing pig producers in ASF 
endemic areas as well as showing that ASF is a heavy burden for many, and on several levels. 
Adina farm has experienced the importance of biosecurity and the possible impacts when 
biosecurity is lacking. Despite this, they see a way forward and have identified pig production 
as a lucrative business to further strengthen their welfare and important work.  Improvements 
in their biosecurity will empower their farm, and hopefully ensure the funding to their 
important work in the community in a long-term perspective. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Questionnaire ID 
 
___________ 
 
2. Date of Survey 
 
 2014-09-17
 2014-09-18
 2014-09-19
 2014-09-20
 2014-09-21
 2014-09-22
 2014-09-23
 2014-09-24
 2014-09-25
 2014-09-26
 2014-09-27
 2014-09-28
 2014-09-29
 2014-09-30
 2014-10-01
 2014-10-02
 2014-10-03
 2014-10-04
 2014-10-05
 2014-10-06
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 2014-10-07
 2014-10-08
 2014-10-09
 
3. You participated in a previous part of this project by answering 
many questions about you and your pigs. According to you, how 
many months has passed since we here last time? 
 
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
 10
 11
 12
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4. Enumerator 
 
 Alike Solomon
 Bruce Nokorach
 Peter Ogweng
 
5. Time interview started 
 
______________________________ 
 
6. Time intreview ended 
 
______________________________ 
 
7. Name of the head of the household 
 
______________________________ 
 
8. Respondents name 
 
______________________________ 
 
9. Respondents telephone number 
 
______________________________ 
 
10. Gender of respondent 
 
27 
 
 Male
 Female
 
11. Marital status of household head 
 
 Married
 Widow/widower
 Single parent
 Other (specify)
 
If other, specify: 
  
______________________________ 
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12. Subcounty 
 
 Awach
 Bardege
 Bobi
 Bungatira
 Koro
 Lakwana
 Lalogi
 Odek
 Ongako
 Paicho
 Palaro
 Patiko
 Unyama
 
13. Parish 
 
 Acoyo
 Abwoch
 Agonga
 Alokolum
 Angaya
 Atiabar
 Bardege
 Binya
 Forgod
 Gem
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 Gweng Diya
 Ibakara
 Idobo
 Kal
 Kal-ali
 Kalumu
 Kanyagoga
 Kasubi
 Labworomor
 Laliya
 Lamola
 Lapinat west
 Laroo
 Lujorogole
 Lukwir
 Mede
 Otino
 Pabwo
 Paduny
 Paidwe
 Pakwelo
 Palenga
 Parwech
 Patuda
 Pawel
 Pugwinyi
 Pukony
 Te-got
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14. Village 
 
______________________________ 
 
15. GPS coordinates Latitdues N/S 
 
___________ 
 
16. GPS coordinates Longitudes E/W 
 
___________ 
 
17. Household details: Did anyone leave or enter the household since 
last visist? 
 
Compare with list from last visit 
 
 Yes
 No
 
Specify if entry or exit, if entry provide details in question below, if exit 
specify whom. Compare to list from last visit. 
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18. Household details 
 
Gender: 1=Male, 2=Female 
 
Relationship to household head:  
1 = Head, 2 = Spouse , 3 = Child, 4 = Sibling, 5 = Parent,  
6 = Grandchild, 7 = Other relative, 8 = Non-relative (including employees who live 
in house), 9 = Other (specify in comments) 
 
Highest education level: 
 0 = No formal education, 1 = Nursery, 2 = Pre-school age,  
3 = Primary education (P1-P4),  
4 = Primary education (P5-P7), 5 = Secondary school (S1-S2),  
6 = Secondary school (S3-S4),  
7 = High school (S5-S6), 8 = Vocational training (specify no of years in comments), 
9 = Tertiary training (specify no of years in comments), 10 = University degree 
(undergraduate) 
11 = University degree (postgraduate), 12=Adult literacy, 13=Other (specify in 
comments) 
 
Primary source of income: 
 0 = None, 1 = Crop farming, 2 = Pig keeping (incl. sales) , 3 = Cattle keeping, 4 = 
Poultry/keeping (inc. sales), 5 = Salaried employment, 6 = Self-employed-off farm, 
7 = Casual laborer, 8 = Boda boda,  
9 = Student/pupil, 10 = Charcoal burning, 11 = Pre-school age,  
12 = Other (specify in comments) 
 
 
 Members of 
household  
[FIRST NAMES] 
Year of 
birth 
Gender  
 
Relationship 
to 
household 
head 
Highest 
education 
level 
attained  
Primary 
source of 
income 
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1       
2       
3       
4       
 
 
Comments 
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20. Chidren of school age: 
 
Type of school:  
1=Public (UPE/USE) day school, 2=Private day school, 3= Private boarding 
school, 4= Religious day school,  
5= Religious boarding school, 6=Other (specify in comments) 
 
Reason  for missed school days:  
1=School closed, 2=Child sick, 3=Child needed at home (work, other), 4= 
Could not pay school fees or material, 5=Other (specify in comments) 
 
 Name Type of 
school 
Cost per 
term 
Number of 
missed 
schooldays 
during last 
term 
Reason 
for  
missed  
schoolday
s 
 
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
11      
12      
13      
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Comments 
 
22. Does the household have off-farm income? 
 
 Yes
 No
 
23. Is the household engaged in the following pig related activities 
 
 Pig trading
 Processing of pork/pork products (e.g. slaughter)
 Operating a butchery
 Operating a pork kiosk
 Operating a pork joint
 Other
 
If other, specify 
  
______________________________ 
 
24. Indicate the type and number of livestock kept/owned currently 
 
Pigs  _________________________ 
14      
15      
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Cattle  _________________________ 
Sheep  _________________________ 
Goats  _________________________ 
Poultry  _________________________ 
Other  _________________________ 
 
25. Indicate the different categories of pigs kept currently: 
 
Breed type: 1=Local, 2=Cross, 3=Exotic 
Housing: 1=Confined, 2=Tethered, 3=Free range 
 
 Numbers kept Breed type Housing 
Breeding boars ___________ ___________ ___________ 
Breeding sows ___________ ___________ ___________ 
Growers ___________ ___________ ___________ 
Piglets ___________ ___________ ___________ 
 
26. Have any pigs left your herd since the last visit? 
 
 Yes
 No
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27. Pig exits 
 
Breed: 1=Local, 2=Cross, 3=Exotic 
How exited: 1=Sold, 2=Sold because sick, 3=Sold because fear of pig 
disease, 4=Slaughter for sale,  
5= Slaughter for household consumption,  6=Slaughter because sick, 
7=Stolen, 8=Death, 9=Gift, 10=Other (specify in comments) 
In case of death, cause: 1=Disease, 2=Starvation, 3=Poisoned, 4=Injury, 
5=Other (specify in comments) 
 
 Breed How exited How many 
pigs exited 
How 
many pigs 
died 
In case of 
death; 
cause 
If disease; 
which 
Breeding 
boars 
      
Breeding 
boars 
      
Breeding 
boars 
      
Breeding 
sows 
      
Breeding 
sows 
      
Breeding 
sows 
      
Growers       
Growers       
Growers       
Piglets       
Piglets       
Piglets       
 
28. Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29. Has there been any inflow of pigs through purchases, births or 
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any other form since the last visit? 
 
 Yes
 No
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30. Pig entries 
 
Breed: 1=Local, 2=Cross, 3=Exotic 
Type of entry: 1=Bought from smallholder farm, 2=Bought from individual 
trader/broker, 3=Bought from a large scale farm, 4=Loan from project, 
5=Gift,  6=Birth/born on farm, 7=Other (specify in comments) 
Reason for purchase: 1=Replace old stock, 2=Saving money, 3=Prestige, 
4=Expand herd, 5=Other (specify in commetns) 
Purchase point: 1=Within village, 2=Neighbouring village, 3=Other (specify 
in comments) 
 
 Breed Type of 
entry 
How 
many 
pigs 
Reason for 
purchase 
Cost per 
animal 
Purchase 
point 
Breeding boars       
Breeding boars       
Breeding boars       
Breeding sows       
Breeding sows       
Breeding sows       
Growers       
Growers       
Growers       
Piglets       
Piglets       
Piglets       
 
31. Comments 
 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
 
32. Have you done any expansion in the pig enterprise since last 
visit? 
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 Yes
 No
 
33. If yes, specify how: 
 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
 
34. Do you keep records associated with the pig enterprise? 
 
 Yes
 No
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35. What types of records? 
 
 Feeds
 Reproduction and breeding
 Animal inventory (births, deaths, sales)
 Financial (income and expenditure)
 Other
 
If other, specify 
  
______________________________ 
 
36. Did you sell any pigs since the last visit? 
 
 Yes
 No
 
37. Indicate the numbers sold from each pig category: 
 
Sales outlet: 1=Farm gate, 2=Village/local market. 
3=Slaughterhouse/abbatoir, 4=Butchery, 5=Other (specify in 
coments) 
 
 How many 
sold 
Weight (live) Weight 
(carcass) 
Price/head 
(UGX) 
Sales outlet 
Breeding 
boars 
     
Breeding 
sows 
     
Growers      
Piglets      
 
38. Comments 
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______________________________ 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
 
39. Did you have any other income related to products from your 
own pigs since the last visit? 
 
 Yes
 No
 
40. If yes, what was the total income since the last visit? 
 
______________________________ 
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41. Do you own a breeding boar? 
(If no skip to Q 44) 
 
 Yes
 No
 
42. Do you use it/them for own or communal breeding? 
 
 Own
 Village/communal
 Other
 
If other, specify: 
  
______________________________ 
 
43. How much do you charge per service (UGX)? 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
44. What was your total income from the breeding boar since the 
last visit? 
 
______________________________ 
 
45. Indicate the source of breeding for the sows since the last visit 
 
 Didnt do any breeding
 Own boar
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 Other boar
 
If other, specify: 
  
______________________________ 
 
46. What is the cost per service  (UGX or other)? 
 
______________________________ 
 
47. What was your total expenditure for the breeding service since 
the last visit? 
 
______________________________ 
 
48. Did you have any hired labour engaged in the pig enterprise 
since the last visit? 
 
 Yes
 No
 
  
44 
 
49. If yes, what was your total expenditure for hired labour engaged 
in the pig enterprise since the last visit (UGX)? 
 
______________________________ 
 
50. Did your pigs recieve any medical treatments (deworming, 
antiparasitic, profylaxis, antibiotics, vaccination) since the last visit? 
 
 Yes
 No
 
51. If yes, what treatment(s)? 
 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
 
52. What was your total expenditure for medical treatments since 
the last visit (UGX )? 
 
______________________________ 
 
53. Did you have any expenditure for biosecurity eqipment 
(protective clothing, boots, disinfectants etc)  since the last visit? 
 
 Yes
 No
 
54. If yes, what sort fo equipment did you buy? 
 
______________________________ 
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______________________________ 
 
55. What was your total expenditure for bio security eqipment since 
the last visit (UGX )? 
 
______________________________ 
 
56. Did you receive any extension service related to pigs since the 
last visit? 
 
 Yes
 No
 
57. What was your total expenditure for extension service related to 
pigs since the last visit (UGX)? 
 
______________________________ 
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58. What was your total expenditure on pig feeds since the last visit 
(UGX)? 
 
______________________________ 
 
59. Since the last visit, did you have to sell any household assets due 
to losses incured in the pig production? 
 
 Yes
 No
 
60. If yes, Indicate what asset and the price obtained 
 
 Type of asset Price obtained 
Asset ___________ ___________ 
Asset ___________ ___________ 
Asset ___________ ___________ 
 
61. Since the last visit, how many times a week did your family eat 
meat (on average)? 
 
______________________________ 
 
62. Have you needed any financial credit since the last visit)? 
 
 Yes
 No
 
63. If yes, did you get the credit? 
 
47 
 
 Yes
 No
 
64. If no, why was credit not acquired? 
 
 No collateral
 Credit terms unfavourable
 Other
 
If other, specify: 
  
______________________________ 
 
65. Amonut needed, recieved, interest rate and use of credit 
 
Reasons: 1=Family health problems, 2=Animal health problems, 3=Crop 
failure, 4=Investments, 5=Pay school fees, 6=Wedding, 7=Funeral, 8= 
Other, spcify in comments 
Use of credit: 1=Feeds, 2=Animal health, 3=Labour, 4=Capital costs, 
5=Other (specify in comments) 
 
 
 Reason for 
needing 
credit 
Amount 
needed 
Amount 
received 
Interest rate Use of credit 
Credit 1      
Credit 2      
Credit 3      
 
66. Comments 
 
______________________________ 
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______________________________ 
 
67. Since the last visit; 67. Since the last visit; 
 
  
 No, none   
 
Most not Some yes, 
some not 
Yes, most Yes, 
all    
Have the family been able to pay all 
needed school fees? 
     
Have the family been able to meet all 
medical expenses that has come up 
     
Have there been any family gatherings 
(weddings, funeral, baptisms) etc that 
had to be changed or postponed due to 
lack of money? 
     
   
 
Comments 
  
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
 
68. Since the last visit; 
 
 No, 
never  
 
Most of 
the times 
not 
Sometimes 
yes, 
sometimes not 
Yes, most of 
the time 
Yes,   always   
I feel more optimistic about 
the pig enterprise 
     
There has been an 
increase in disputes, 
disagreements or jealousy 
among my neighbours 
     
I have lost confidence in 
pig production 
     
I am no longer participating      
    
  
  
  
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in the social networks like I 
used to do 
 
Comments 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69. How do you agree with the following statements; 
 
 Strongly 
disagree  
 
Disagre
e 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly 
agree   
I think it is possible to protect my pigs 
from getting ASF by improving farm bio 
security 
     
Eating pork from pigs that have died 
from ASF is safe for human health 
     
If I would get a fair price I would be 
willing to sell all my heatlhy pigs when 
an ASF-outbreak were present in the 
area 
     
I would like to invest in farm bio security 
if I recieved advice on what to do 
     
I would be happy to buy pork products 
from a slaughterhouse that recieve pigs 
that have been in contact with pigs 
dying from ASF 
     
It is safe to give pigs water that has 
been used to clean knifes and pangas 
used for slasughtering and butchering 
as drinking water 
     
Buying live pigs is a risk behaviour for 
contracting ASF 
     
I dont want to eat or buy pork from pigs 
that have died from ASF 
     
I can not afford to invest in my pig 
farming 
     
ASF can not be prevented      
I can choose where/to whom I sell my 
pigs 
     
Frequent sellling and buying of pigs is      
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neccessary for succesfull pig farming 
Improved farm bio security improves 
pig health and pig growth 
     
I could adopt my pig farming in order to 
have pigs ready for sale at specific 
times of the year 
     
Cooking kills the ASF-virus      
It is possible for me to tell visitors such 
as veterinarians, middle men and 
extension workers not to enter in the 
pig house with their own boots 
     
If pork prices are lower in the 
neighbouring village due to them having 
an outbreak of ASF I will buy my pork 
there 
     
 
Comments 
 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
 
70. Comments 
 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire used in study one. 
